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Abstract. Priced oblivious transfer (POT) is a cryptographic protocol that can be
used to protect customer privacy in e-commerce applications. Namely, it allows
a buyer to purchase an item from a seller without disclosing to the latter which
item was purchased and at which price. Unfortunately, existing POT schemes
have some drawbacks in terms of design and functionality. First, the design of
existing POT schemes is not modular. Typically, a POT scheme extends a k-out-
of-N oblivious transfer (OT) scheme by adding prices to the items. However, all
POT schemes do not use OT as a blackbox building block with certain secu-
rity guarantees. Consequently, security of the OT scheme needs to be reanalyzed
while proving security of the POT scheme, and it is not possible to swap the un-
derlying OT scheme with any other OT scheme. Second, existing POT schemes
do not allow the seller to obtain any kind of statistics about the buyer’s purchases,
which hinders customer and sales management. Moreover, the seller is not able
to change the prices of items without restarting the protocol from scratch.
We propose a POT scheme that addresses the aforementioned drawbacks. We
prove the security of our POT in the UC framework. We modify a standard POT
functionality to allow the seller to receive aggregate statistics about the buyer’s
purchases and to change prices dynamically. We present a modular construction
for POT that realizes our functionality in the hybrid model. One of the building
blocks is an ideal functionality for OT. Therefore, our protocol separates the tasks
carried out by the underlying OT scheme from the additional tasks needed by a
POT scheme. Thanks to that, our protocol is a good example of modular design
and can be instantiated with any secure OT scheme as well as other building
blocks without reanalyzing security from scratch.
1 Introduction
Priced oblivious transfer (POT) [1] is a cryptographic protocol that can be used to pro-
tect privacy in e-commerce applications. POT is a protocol between a seller or vendor V
and a buyer B. V sells N items (represented as messages) 〈mn〉Nn=1 with prices 〈pn〉Nn=1
assigned to them. At any transfer phase, B chooses an index σ ∈ [1,N ] and purchases
the message mσ . Security for B ensures that V does not learn the index σ or the price pσ
paid by B. Security for V ensures that B pays the correct price pσ for the message mσ
and that B does not learn any information about the messages that are not purchased.
Typically, POT schemes use a prepaid mechanism [1,5,19,20,18,2]. B makes an
initial deposit dep to V , revealing the amount dep to V . B and V can use an existing
payment mechanism of their choice to carry out this transaction. After the deposit phase,
when B purchases a message mσ , the price pσ is subtracted from the deposit, but the
POT protocol ensures that: (1) V does not learn the new value dep′ = dep − pσ of the
deposit and (2) dep′ ≥ 0.
Unfortunately, existing POT schemes [1,5,19,20,18,2] have some drawbacks in terms
of design and functionality. We describe them below.
Lack of Modular Design. POT schemes [1,5,19,20,18,2] have so far been built by ex-
tending an existing oblivious transfer (OT) scheme. OT is a protocol between a sender
and a receiver. The sender inputs N messages 〈mn〉Nn=1. At each transfer phase, the
receiver obtains the message mσ for her choice σ ∈ [1,N ]. Receiver security ensures
that the sender does not learn σ, while sender security ensures that the receiver does not
learn any information about other messages.
In OT schemes that have been used to build POT schemes, the interaction between
the sender and the receiver consists of an initialization phase followed by several trans-
fer phases. In the initialization phase, the sender encrypts messages 〈mn〉Nn=1 and sends
the list of ciphertexts to the receiver. In each transfer phase, the receiver, on input σ,
computes a blinded request for the sender. The sender sends a response that allows the
receiver to decrypt the ciphertext that encrypts mσ .
Roughly speaking, to construct a POT scheme from an OT scheme, typically the OT
scheme is extended as follows. First, in the initialization phase, the computation of the
ciphertexts is modified in order to bind them to the prices of the encrypted messages,
e.g. by using a signature scheme. Second, a deposit phase, where the buyer sends an
initial deposit to the seller, is added. As a result of this deposit phase, the seller and the
buyer output a commitment or encryption to the deposit dep. Third, in each transfer
phase, the request computed in the OT scheme is extended by the buyer in order to send
to the seller an encryption or commitment to the new value dep′ of the deposit and to
prove to the seller (e.g. by using a zero-knowledge proof) that dep′ = dep − pσ and
that dep′ ≥ 0.
The main drawback of the design of existing POT schemes is a lack of modularity.
Although, as described above, each POT scheme is based on an underlying OT scheme,
the latter is not used as a black-box building block. Instead, every OT scheme is mod-
ified and extended ad-hoc to create the POT scheme, blurring what components were
present in the original OT scheme and what components were added to create the POT
scheme.
The lack of modularity has two main negative consequences. First, existing POT
schemes cannot easily be modified to use another OT scheme as a building block, for
example, a more efficient one. In contrast, a POT scheme designed modularly can use
any secure OT scheme as a building block, thereby allowing multiple instantiations of
the POT scheme. Second, every time a new POT scheme is designed, the proofs need
to be done from scratch. This means that the security of the underlying OT scheme
will be reanalyzed instead of relying on its security guarantees. This is usually not easy
and prone to mistakes. On the contrary, the security analysis of a POT scheme designed
modularly would prove that the POT scheme is secure when instantiated with any secure
OT scheme without reproving security from scratch.
Lack of Advanced Functionality. Existing POT schemes [1,5,19,20,18,2] have two
drawbacks in their functionality that hinder their use in practical e-commerce appli-
cations.
Lack of Purchase Statistics. POT schemes effectively prevent the seller from learn-
ing what messages are purchased by the buyer. Although this is a nice privacy feature
for the buyer, the customer and sales management becomes more difficult for the seller.
For example, the seller is not able to know which items are more demanded by buyers
and which ones sell poorly. As another example, the seller is not able to use marketing
techniques like giving discounts that depend on the previous purchases of a buyer. It
would be desirable that, while protecting privacy of each individual purchase, the seller
could obtain some aggregate statistics about the buyer’s purchases.
Lack of Dynamic Pricing. In existing POT schemes, the price of a message is
static, i.e. each message is associated with a price in the initialization phase and that
price cannot change afterwards. In practical e-commerce settings, this is undesirable
because sellers would like to be able to change the price of a product easily. However,
modifying existing POT schemes to allow sellers to change the prices of messages at
any time throughout the protocol execution is not straightforward and would require
rerunning the initialization phase.
1.1 Our Contribution
We propose a POT scheme that addresses the aforementioned drawbacks of the existing
POT schemes. Our POT scheme is designed modularly and allows the seller both to
obtain statistics about the purchases of the buyer and to change dynamically the prices
of items.
We define security for POT in the universal composability (UC) framework [11].
To this end, we describe an ideal functionality FPOTS for priced oblivious transfer with
purchase statistics and dynamic pricing. We modify a standard POT functionality to
enable aggregate statistics and dynamic pricing.
Existing functionalities for POT [5,19] consist of three interfaces: an initialization
interface where the seller sends the messages 〈mn〉Nn=1 and the prices 〈pn〉Nn=1 to the
functionality; a deposit interface where the buyer sends a deposit dep to the function-
ality, which reveals dep to the seller; and a transfer interface where the buyer sends an
index σ ∈ [1,N ] to the functionality and receives the message mσ from the functional-
ity if the current deposit is higher than the price of the message. The functionality stores
the updated value of the deposit.
Our functionality FPOTS consists of six interfaces. In addition to the initialization,
deposit and transfer interfaces of prior functionalities for POT [5,19], FPOTS also con-
tains an interface where the seller inputs the prices, an interface where the seller modi-
fies the price of a message, and an interface where the functionality reveals to the seller
the value of a statistic about the purchases of the buyer. We describe these interfaces in
more detail below.
1. In the initialization phase of FPOTS, the seller only inputs the messages 〈mn〉Nn=1.
The prices 〈pn〉Nn=1 are sent by the seller to FPOTS via a “setup price” interface.
Moreover, the seller can modify the price of a message via an “update price” inter-
face. This modification of the functionality is necessary to allow for a POT scheme
where the seller can modify the price of a message at any time throughout the pro-
tocol execution.
2. FPOTS allows the seller to obtain the value of statistics about the purchases of
the buyer. In order to allow for that, FPOTS introduces the following changes in
comparison to existing functionalities for POT [5,19].
First,FPOTS allows the seller to invoke the initialization interface multiple times to
send different tuples 〈mn〉Nn=1 of messages. Each tuple is associated with a unique
epoch identifier ep.
Second, FPOTS stores a table Tblst that contains N counters, one for each message
index. In a transfer phase, the functionality increments the counter of the index
of the message purchased. The idea is that messages of different epochs but with
the same message index correspond to the same type or category of items. (This
happens, e.g. when using POT to construct a conditional access system for pay-
TV [2].) Therefore, in Tblst, the functionality stores the number of times that the
buyer purchases items of each of the types or categories.
Third, FPOTS includes a “reveal statistic” interface where the buyer can request
that the functionality reveals to the seller the value of a statistic computed on input
the counters stored in Tblst. Such statistic could reveal, e.g. the number of times
that items of certain categories were purchased, what category has been purchased
the most, etc. The seller only learns the result of evaluating the statistic on input the
counters in Tblst.
We propose a scheme ΠPOTS that realizes the functionality FPOTS. Our scheme is
designed modularly and provides purchase statistics and dynamic pricing, as described
below.
Modular Design. In the UC framework, protocols can be described modularly by using
a hybrid model where parties invoke the ideal functionalities of the building blocks
of a protocol. For example, consider a protocol that uses as building blocks a zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge and a signature scheme. In a modular description of this
protocol in the hybrid model, parties in the real world invoke the ideal functionalities
for zero-knowledge proofs and for signatures.
We describe our protocol ΠPOTS modularly in the hybrid model. Therefore, the
seller and the buyer in the real world invoke only ideal functionalities for the building
blocks of our protocol. Interestingly, one of the building blocks used in ΠPOTS is the
ideal functionality for oblivious transfer FOT. Thanks to that, our protocol ΠPOTS
separates the task that is carried out by the underlying OT scheme from the additional
tasks that are needed to create a POT scheme.
As mentioned above, the advantages of a modular design are twofold. First, our
protocol ΠPOTS can be instantiated with any secure OT scheme, i.e., any scheme that
realizes FOT. The remaining building blocks of our protocol can also be instantiated
with any scheme that realizes their corresponding ideal functionalities, leading to multi-
ple possible instantiations of ΠPOTS. Second, the security analysis in the hybrid model
is simpler and does not need to reanalyze the security of any of the building blocks.
One challenge when describing a UC protocol in the hybrid model is the need to
ensure that two or more ideal functionalities receive the same input. For example, in
ΠPOTS, it is necessary to enforce that the buyer sends the same index σ ∈ [1,N ] to the
transfer interface of FOT and to another functionality FNHCD (described below) that
binds σ to the price pσ . Otherwise, if an adversarial buyer sends different indexes σ and
σ′ to FOT and FNHCD, the buyer could obtain the message mσ and pay an incorrect
price pσ′ .
To address this issue, we use the method proposed in [8]. In [8], a functionality
FNIC for non-interactive commitments is proposed. When it is necessary to enforce
that two or more functionalities receive the same input from a party, first the party ob-
tains a commitment ccom to the input and the opening copen for that commitment
from FNIC. After that, the party sends the input to the functionality along with ccom
and copen . The functionality verifies the correctness of the commitment by using the
opening. Finally, other parties in the protocol can obtain the commitments received by
several functionalities and check their equality. If the commitments are equal, the bind-
ing property enforced by FNIC ensures that the inputs received by those functionalities
are equal.
In protocol ΠPOTS, we use this method whenever needed. This means that the in-
terfaces of some functionalities used as building blocks have been adapted to receive
committed inputs and to verify the commitments. For example,FOT receives a commit-
ment ccomσ and an opening copenσ along with the index σ.
Purchase Statistics. In ΠPOTS, V can input multiple tuples 〈mn〉Nn=1 of messages. We
consider that messages associated with the same index σ belong to the same category.
ΠPOTS allows B to reveal to V information related to how many purchases were
made for each of the item categories. To do that, B stores a table Tblst of counters of
how many purchases were made for each category. The table Tblst contains position-
value entries [σ, vσ], where σ ∈ [1,N ] is the category index and vσ is the counter. Any
time a message mσ is purchased, the counter for category σ is incremented in Tblst. At
any time throughout the execution of ΠPOTS, B can choose a statistic ST, evaluate it
on input Tblst and reveal to V the result.
Additionally, B must prove to V that the result is correct. In order to do that, it is
necessary to implement a mechanism that allows V to keep track of the purchases made
the buyer, without learning them. To implement this mechanism, ΠPOTS uses the ideal
functionality for a committed database FCD recently proposed in [7]. FCD stores the
table Tblst of counters and allowsB to read the counters from Tblst and to write updated
counters into Tblst each time a purchase is made. V does not learn any information read
or written but is guaranteed of the correctness of that information. We describe in more
detail FCD in Section A. Here we stress that FCD allows B to hide from V not only the
value of counters read or written, but also the positions where they are read or written
into Tblst. This is a crucial property to construct ΠPOTS, because the position read or
written is equal to the index σ, which needs to be hidden from the seller in order to hide
what message is purchased. Also we stress that FCD receives committed inputs, which
allows us to enforce that the index σ sent by B toFOT to retrieve message mσ is equal to
the position σ sent to FCD to increment the counter vσ . In [7], an efficient construction
for FCD based on vector commitments [16,12] is provided. In this construction, after
setup, the efficiency of the read and write operations does not depend on the size of the
table, and instantiations of the construction with a concrete vector commitment scheme
are practical.
Dynamic Pricing. In existing POT schemes [1,5,19,20,18,2], when V encrypts the mes-
sages 〈mn〉Nn=1 in the initialization phase, the price of the encrypted message is some-
how bound to the corresponding ciphertext. This binding is done in such a way that,
when B computes a request to purchase a message mσ , V is guaranteed that the correct
price pσ is subtracted from the deposit while still not learning pσ . In some schemes,
V uses a signature scheme to sign the prices in the initialization phase, and B uses a
zero-knowledge proof of signature possession to compute the request.
It would be possible to modify the initialization phase of those schemes so that
ciphertexts on the messages 〈mn〉Nn=1 are computed independently of the signatures on
the prices 〈pn〉Nn=1, yet enforcing that requests computed by B use the right price pσ
for the requested index σ. (For example, both the ciphertext and the signature could
embed the index σ, and the buyer, as part of a request, would be required to prove in
zero-knowledge that the index in the ciphertext and in the signature are equal.) This
would allow V to modify the prices of messages by issuing new signatures, without
needing to re-encrypt the messages. However, this mechanism to update prices would
also require some method to revoke the previous signatures, which would heavily affect
the efficiency to the ΠPOTS protocol.
Instead, we use the functionality FNHCD for a non-hiding committed database re-
cently proposed in [17]. FNHCD stores a table Tblnhcd with entries [σ, pσ], where
σ ∈ [1,N ] is an index and pσ is a price. V sets the initial values of Tblnhcd and is also
able to modify Tblnhcd at any time. B knows the content of Tblnhcd but cannot modify
it. When purchasing a message of index σ, B reads from FNHCD the entry [σ, pσ]. V
does not learn any information about the entry read, yet V is guaranteed that a valid
entry is read. We describe FNHCD more in detail in Section A. Similarly to the case of
FCD, we stress that FNHCD reveals to V neither the position σ nor the value pσ , and
that FNHCD receives committed inputs that allow us to prove that the index σ received
by FCD and by FOT are the same. In [17], an efficient construction for FCD based on
non-hiding vector commitments [16,12] is provided. In this construction, after setup,
the efficiency of the read and write operations does not depend on the size of the table,
and instantiations of the construction with a concrete non-hiding vector commitment
scheme are practical.
Outline of the Paper. In Section 2, we describe related work. We define our ideal
functionality FPOTS in Section 3. In Appendix A, we describe the building blocks
of our construction, and in Section 4 we depict construction ΠPOTS. We conclude in
Section 5. Finally, in Section B we analyze the security of ΠPOTS.
2 Related Work
POT was initially proposed in [1]. The POT scheme in [1] is secure in a half-simulation
model, where a simulation-based security definition is used to protect seller security,
while an indistinguishability-based security definition is used to protect buyer privacy.
Later, POT schemes in the full-simulation model [5] and UC-secure schemes [19] were
proposed. The scheme in [5] provides unlinkability between seller and buyer, i.e., the
seller cannot link interactions with the same buyer.
We define security for POT in the UC model, like [19], and our protocol does not
provide unlinkability. Although unlinkability is important in some settings, an unlink-
able POT scheme would require the use of an anonymous communication network and,
in the deposit phase, it would hinder the use of widespread payment mechanisms that
require authentication. Therefore, because one of the goals of this work is to facili-
tate sellers’ deployment of POT schemes, we chose to describe a scheme that does not
provide unlinkability.
In [20], a transformation that takes a POT scheme and produces a POT scheme with
optimistic fair exchange is proposed. This transformation can also be used with our
POT scheme.
The use of POT as building block in e-commerce applications in order to protect
buyer privacy has been described, e.g. in the context of buyer-seller watermarking pro-
tocols for copyright protection [18] and conditional access systems for pay-TV [2]. Our
POT protocol is suitable to be used in any of the proposed settings and it provides
additional functionalities to the seller.
Oblivious transfer with access control (OTAC) [13,4] is a generalization of obliv-
ious transfer where messages are associated with access control policies. In order to
obtain a message, a receiver must prove that she fulfils the requirements described in
the associated access control policy. In some schemes, access control policies are pub-
lic [13,4,21,15], while other schemes hide them from the receiver [6,3].
POT could be seen as a particular case of OTAC with public access control poli-
cies. In POT, the public access control policy that a buyer must fulfil to get a message
is defined as her current deposit being higher than the price of the message. However,
existing OTAC schemes cannot straightforwardly be converted into a POT scheme. The
reason is that, in POT, the fulfilment of a policy by a buyer depends on the history of
purchases and deposits of that buyer, i.e., whether or not the current deposit of a buyer
allows him to buy a message depends on how much the buyer deposited and spent be-
fore. Therefore, POT schemes need to implement a mechanism that allows the seller to
keep track of the current deposit of the buyer without learning it, such as a commitment
or an encryption of the deposit that is updated by the buyer at each deposit or purchase
phase. (Our POT protocol uses functionality FCD to store the deposit, in addition to
the counters of purchases.) In contrast, existing OTAC schemes do not provide such a
mechanism. In those schemes, usually a third party called issuer certifies the attributes
of a receiver, and after that the receiver can use those certifications to prove the she
fulfils an access control policy.
Aside from solutions based on oblivious transfer, privacy protection in e-commerce
can also be provided by protocols that offer anonymity/unlinkability. Here the goal is to
protect the identity of buyer rather than the identity of the items that are purchased. Most
solutions involve anonymous payment mechanisms [9] and anonymous communication
networks [14].
3 Ideal Functionality for POT with Statistics and Dynamic Pricing
We prove our protocol secure in the universal composability framework [11]. The UC
framework allows one to define and analyze the security of cryptographic protocols
so that security is retained under an arbitrary composition with other protocols. The
security of a protocol is defined by means of an ideal protocol that carries out the desired
task. In the ideal protocol, all parties send their inputs to an ideal functionality F for
the task. The ideal functionality locally computes the outputs of the parties and provides
each party with its prescribed output.
The security of a protocol ϕ is analyzed by comparing the view of an environment
Z in a real execution of ϕ against that of Z in the ideal protocol defined in Fϕ. The
environment Z chooses the inputs of the parties and collects their outputs. In the real
world, Z can communicate freely with an adversary A who controls both the network
and any corrupt parties. In the ideal world, Z interacts with dummy parties, who simply
relay inputs and outputs between Z and Fϕ, and a simulator S. We say that a protocol
ϕ securely realizes Fϕ if Z cannot distinguish the real world from the ideal world, i.e.,
Z cannot distinguish whether it is interacting with A and parties running protocol ϕ or
with S and dummy parties relaying to Fϕ.
A protocol ϕG securely realizes F in the G-hybrid model when ϕ is allowed to
invoke the ideal functionality G. Therefore, for any protocol ψ that securely realizes
the functionality G, the composed protocol ϕψ , which is obtained by replacing each
invocation of an instance of G with an invocation of an instance of ψ, securely realizes
F .
In the ideal functionalities described in this paper, we consider static corruptions.
We depict our functionality FPOTS for POT with purchase statistics and dynamic
pricing.FPOTS interacts with a seller V and with a buyerB and consists of the following
interfaces:
1. V uses the pot.init interface to send a list of messages 〈mn〉Nn=1 and an epoch
identifier ep to FPOTS. FPOTS stores 〈mn〉Nn=1 and ep, and sends N and ep to
B. In the first invocation of this interface, FPOTS also initializes a table Tblst of
counters of the number of purchases of each category, and a deposit dep′.
2. V uses the pot.setupprices interface to send a list of prices 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 to FPOTS,
where Nmax is the maximum number of messages in an epoch. FPOTS stores
〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 and sends 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 to B.
3. V uses the pot.updateprice interface to send an index n and a price p to FPOTS.
FPOTS updates the stored list 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 with p at position n , and sends n and p to
B.
4. B uses the pot.deposit interface to send a deposit dep to FPOTS. FPOTS updates
the stored deposit dep′ ← dep′ + dep and sends dep to V .
5. B uses the pot.transfer interface to send an epoch ep and an index σ to FPOTS. If
dep′ ≥ pσ , FPOTS increments the counter for category σ in Tblst and sends mσ
for the epoch ep to B.
6. B uses the pot.revealstatistic interface to send a function ST to FPOTS. FPOTS
evaluates ST on input table Tblst and sends the result v and ST to V .
In previous functionalities for POT [5,19], V sends the messages and prices through
the pot.init interface. In contrast, our functionality uses the interfaces pot.setupprices
and pot.updateprice to send and update the prices. This change allows the design of
a protocol where V can update prices without rerunning the initialization phase. We
also note that, in FPOTS, all the messages mσ of the same category σ have the same
price for any epoch. The idea here is that messages of the same category represent
the same type of content, which is updated by V at each new epoch. Nevertheless, it is
straightforward to modify FPOTS so that V can send a new list of prices for each epoch.
Our construction in Section 4 can easily be modified to allow different prices for each
epoch.
FPOTS initializes a counter ctv and a counter ctb in the pot.setupprices interface.
ctv is incremented each time V sends the update of a price, and ctb is incremented each
time B receives the update of a price. These counters are used by FPOTS to check that
V and B have the same list of prices. We note that the simulator S, when queried by
FPOTS, may not reply or may provide a delayed response, which could prevent price
updates sent by V to be received by B.
Table Tblst stores entries of the form [σ, count], where σ ∈ [1,Nmax] is a category
and count is a counter of the number of purchases made for that category. ST may be
any function from a universe Ψ .
When invoked by V or B, FPOTS first checks the correctness of the input. Con-
cretely, FPOTS aborts if that input does not belong to the correct domain. FPOTS also
aborts if an interface is invoked at an incorrect moment in the protocol. For example, V
cannot invoke the pot.updateprice interface before the pot.setupprices interface. Simi-
lar conditions for abortion are listed whenFPOTS receives a message from the simulator
S.
Before FPOTS queries the simulator S, FPOTS saves its state, which is later recov-
ered when receiving a response from S. When an interface, e.g. pot.updateprice, can be
invoked more than once, FPOTS creates a query identifier qid , which allows FPOTS to
match a query to S to a response from S. Creating qid is not necessary if an interface,
such as pot.setupprices, can be invoked only once, or if it can be invoked only once
with a concrete input revealed to S, such as pot.init, which can be invoked only once
for each epoch.
Compared to previous functionalities for POT, or to other ideal functionalities in
the literature, FPOTS looks more complex. The reason is simply that we list all the
conditions for abortion and that FPOTS saves state information before querying S and
recovers it after receiving a response from S. These operations are also required but
have frequently been omitted in the description of ideal functionalities in the literature,
which is error-prone.
When FPOTS reveals information to S, this means that an adversary that controls
the network but corrupts neither V nor B is allowed to learn this information. For exam-
ple, in the pot.init interface, S learns the epoch ep and the number of messages N . This
means that a construction for FPOTS does not need to hide them from an adversary that
controls the network.
In FPOTS, the session identifier sid has the structure (V,B, sid ′). This allows any
vendor V to create an instance of FPOTS with any buyer B. After the first invocation of
FPOTS, FPOTS implicitly checks that the session identifier in a message is equal to the
one received in the first invocation. We describe FPOTS below.
Description of FPOTS. Functionality FPOTS runs with a vendor V and a buyer B, and
is parameterised with a maximum number of messages Nmax, a message spaceM, a
maximum deposit value depmax, a maximum price Pmax, and a universe of statistics
Ψ that consists of ppt algorithms.
1. On input (pot.init.ini, sid , ep, 〈mn〉Nn=1) from V:
– Abort if sid /∈ (V,B, sid ′).
– Abort if (sid , ep′, 〈mn〉Nn=1, 0), where ep′ = ep, is already stored.
– Abort if N > Nmax, or if for n = 1 to N , mn /∈M.
– Store (sid , ep, 〈mn〉Nn=1, 0).
– Send (pot.init.sim, sid , ep,N ) to S.
S. On input (pot.init.rep, sid , ep) from S:
– Abort if (sid , ep, 〈mn〉Nn=1, 0) is not stored, or if (sid , ep, 〈mn〉Nn=1, 1) is al-
ready stored.
– If a tuple (sid ,Tblst) is not stored, initialize dep′ ← 0 and a table Tblst with
entries [i, 0] for i = 1 to Nmax, and store (sid , dep′,Tblst).
– Store (sid , ep, 〈mn〉Nn=1, 1).
– Send (pot.init.end, sid , ep,N ) to B.
2. On input (pot.setupprices.ini, sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ) from V:
– Abort if sid /∈ (V,B, sid ′) or if (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctv ) is already stored.
– Abort if, for n = 1 to Nmax, pn /∈ (0,Pmax].
– Initialize a counter ctv ← 0 and store (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctv ).
– Send (pot.setupprices.sim, sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ) to S.
S. On input (pot.setupprices.rep, sid) from S:
– Abort if (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctv ) is not stored, or if (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctb) is already
stored.
– Initialize a counter ctb ← 0 and store (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctb).
– Send (pot.setupprices.end, sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ) to B.
3. On input (pot.updateprice.ini, sid ,n, p) from V:
– Abort if (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctv ) is not stored.
– Abort if n /∈ [1,Nmax], or if p /∈ (0,Pmax].
– Increment ctv , set pn ← p and store them into the tuple (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctv ).
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid ,n, p, ctv ).
– Send (pot.updateprice.sim, sid , qid ,n, p) to S.
S. On input (pot.updateprice.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid ,n, p, ctv ) is not stored, or if (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctb) is not stored,
or if ctv 6= ctb + 1.
– Increment ctb , set pn ← p, and store them into the tuple (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctb).
– Delete the record (qid ,n, p, ctv ).
– Send (pot.updateprice.end, sid ,n, p) to B.
4. On input (pot.deposit.ini, sid , dep) from B:
– Abort if (sid , dep′,Tblst) is not stored, or if dep′ + dep /∈ [0, depmax].
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , dep).
– Send (pot.deposit.sim, sid , qid) to S.
S. On input (pot.deposit.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , dep) is not stored.
– Set dep′ ← dep′ + dep and update (sid , dep′,Tblst).
– Delete the record (qid , dep).
– Send (pot.deposit.end, sid , dep) to V .
5. On input (pot.transfer.ini, sid , ep, σ) from B:
– Abort if (sid , ep′, 〈mn〉Nn=1, 1) for ep′ = ep is not stored.
– Abort if (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctb) and (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , ctv ) are not stored, or if
ctb 6= ctv .
– Abort if σ /∈ [1,N ], or if dep′ < pσ , where dep′ is stored in (sid , dep′,Tblst).
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , ep, σ,mσ).
– Send (pot.transfer.sim, sid , qid , ep) to S.
S. On input (pot.transfer.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , ep, σ,mσ) is not stored.
– Set dep′ ← dep′ − pσ , increment count for the entry [σ, count] in Tblst, and
update (sid , dep′,Tblst).
– Delete the record (qid , ep, σ,mσ).
– Send (pot.transfer.end, sid ,mσ) to B.
6. On input (pot.revealstatistic.ini, sid ,ST) from B:
– Abort if (sid , dep′,Tblst) is not stored.
– Abort if ST /∈ Ψ .
– Set v ← ST(Tblst).
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , v,ST).
– Send (pot.revealstatistic.sim, sid , qid) to S.
S. On input (pot.revealstatistic.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , v,ST) is not stored.
– Delete the record (qid , v,ST).
– Send (pot.revealstatistic.end, sid , v,ST) to V .
4 ConstructionΠPOTS for FPOTS
We describe a construction ΠPOTS that realizes the functionality FPOTS in Section 3.
Our construction works in the hybrid model. The seller V and the buyer B use the ideal
functionalities FAUT, FSMT, FNIC, FRZK, FOT, FCD and FNHCD as building blocks
that we describe in detail in Appendix A. Briefly,FCD is a functionality for a committed
database [7] that allows a prover P to prove to a verifier V that two commitments
ccomi and ccomr commit to a position and value that are read from a table, and that
two commitments ccomi and ccomw commit to a position and value that are written
into the table. FNHCD is a functionality for a non-hiding committed database in [17]
that is similar to FCD. The main difference is that the contents of the table Tblnhcd are
known by both parties.
Intuition. For each epoch ep, V and B use a new instance ofFOT. By usingFOT, B can
obtain messages from V without disclosing the messages obtained. Then, to construct
a POT protocol based on an OT scheme, V must set the prices, and B must pay for
the messages obtained. Additionally, our POT protocol allows V to receive aggregate
statistics about the purchases.
To set prices, V uses FNHCD. In the pot.setupprices interface, V creates an instance
of FNHCD on input a list of prices 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 , which are stored in the table Tblnhcd
in FNHCD. In the pot.updateprice interface, V updates a price in the table Tblnhcd. In
comparison to previous POT protocols, our protocol allows V to update prices with-
out rerunning the initialization phase. Additionally, FNHCD, with its realization based
on non-hiding vector commitments [17], allows for very efficient updates. Other POT
protocols that use signatures to bind prices to messages would need some signature
revocation mechanism.
For payments, our POT protocol uses a prepaid mechanism. In the pot.deposit in-
terface, B makes deposits dep to V , which are added to the existing deposit dep′. (To
carry out the payment of dep, V and B use a payment mechanism outside the POT
protocol.) In the pot.transfer interface, the price pσ of the purchased message is sub-
tracted from dep′. V learns dep, but must learn neither dep′ nor pσ . To hide dep′ from
V , B uses FCD. FCD stores dep′ in the position 0 of table Tblcd. In the pot.deposit
interface, B proves in zero-knowledge to V that the deposit is updated correctly as
dep′ ← dep′ + dep and writes the updated deposit into table Tblcd of FCD. In the
pot.transfer interface, B proves in zero-knowledge that dep′ ← dep′ − pσ and writes
the updated deposit into table Tblcd of FCD. Moreover, B uses FNHCD to prove that pσ
is stored in the entry [σ, pσ] of the table stored in FNHCD, where σ is the index that B
gives as input toFOT to obtain the message mσ . This guarantees that B pays the correct
price for message mσ . To guarantee that FOT, FNHCD and the functionalities FRZK for
zero-knowledge receive the same input, B sends committed inputs, where commitments
are obtained from FNIC.
For statistics,FCD is used to store counters on the number of purchases of each item
category in the position [1,Nmax] of table Tblcd. In the pot.transfer interface, B reads
the table entry [σ, count1] in FCD, where σ is the index that B gives as input to FOT to
obtain the message mσ . B computes count2 ← count1 + 1, proves in zero-knowledge
the correctness of count2 to V , and writes the entry [σ, count2] in table Tblcd in FCD.
In the pot.revealstatistic interface, B proves in zero-knowledge to V that a statistic v
is the result of evaluating a function ST on input Tblcd. For this purpose, B reads the
required table entries in Tblcd.
ConstructionΠPOTS. ΠPOTS uses the ideal functionalities FAUT, FSMT, FNIC, FRZK,
FOT, FCD and FNHCD. ΠPOTS is parameterised with a maximum number of mes-
sagesNmax, a message spaceM, a maximum deposit value depmax, a maximum price
Pmax, and a universe of statistics Ψ consisting of ppt algorithms.
1. On input (pot.init.ini, sid , ep, 〈mn〉Nn=1), V and B do the following:
– V aborts if sid /∈ (V,B, sid ′).
– V aborts if (sid , ep′,N ) is already stored for ep′ = ep, else stores (sid , ep,N ).
– V aborts if N > Nmax, or if for n = 1 to N , mn /∈M.
– If this is the first execution of this interface, V and B do the following:
• V sets a table Tblcd of Nmax entries where each entry is of the form [i, 0]
for i = 0 to Nmax.
• V sends (cd.setup.ini, sid ,Tblcd) to a new instance of FCD.
• B receives (cd.setup.end, sid ,Tblcd) from FCD.
• If (sid ,Tblcd) is already stored or if, for i = 0 to Nmax, there exists an
entry [i, v] in Tblcd such that v 6= 0, B aborts, else B stores (sid ,Tblcd).
• B sets sidAUT ← (B,V, sid ′) and sends (aut.send.ini, sidAUT, 〈setup〉)
to FAUT.
• V receives (aut.send.end, sidAUT, 〈setup〉) from FAUT.
– V sets sidOT ← (sid , ep).
– V sends (ot.init.ini, sidOT, 〈mn〉Nn=1) to a new instance of FOT.
– B receives (ot.init.end, sidOT,N ) from the instance of FOT.
– B takes ep from sidOT and stores (sid , ep,N ).
– B outputs (pot.init.end, sid , ep,N ).
2. On input (pot.setupprices.ini, sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ), V and B do the following:
– V aborts if sid /∈ (V,B, sid ′) or if (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ) is already stored.
– V aborts if, for n = 1 to Nmax, pn /∈ (0,Pmax].
– V stores (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ).
– For n = 1 to Nmax, V sets a table Tblnhcd with entries [n, pn ].
– V sends (nhcd.setup.ini, sid ,Tblnhcd) to a new instance of FNHCD.
– B receives (nhcd.setup.end, sid ,Tblnhcd) from FNHCD.
– B parses Tblnhcd as [n, pn ], for n = 1 to Nmax, and stores (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ).
– B outputs (pot.setupprices.end, sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ).
3. On input (pot.updateprice.ini, sid ,n, p), V and B do the following:
– V aborts if (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ) is not stored.
– V aborts if n /∈ [1,Nmax], or if p /∈ (0,Pmax].
– V sends (nhcd.write.ini, sid ,n, p) to FNHCD.
– B receives (nhcd.write.end, sid ,n, p) from FNHCD.
– B sets pn ← p) and updates the stored tuple (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ).
– B outputs (pot.updateprice.end, sid ,n, p).
4. On input (pot.deposit.ini, sid , dep), V and B do the following:
– B aborts if sid /∈ (V,B, sid ′).
– B aborts if (sid , ep,N ) is not stored for any ep.
– B retrieves [0, v] from Tblcd and sets dep1 ← v.
– B aborts if dep1 + dep /∈ [0, depmax].
– If this is the first execution of the deposit interface, B does the following:
• B sends (com.setup.ini, sid) to FNIC.
• B receives (com.setup.end, sid , OK) from FNIC.
– If (sid , ccomdep2 , copendep2) is already stored, B sets ccomdep1 ← ccomdep2
and copendep1 ← copendep2 . Otherwise, B does the following:• B sends (com.commit.ini, sid , dep1) to FNIC.
• B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccomdep1 , copendep1) from FNIC.
– B sets dep2← dep1 + dep.
– B sends (com.commit.ini, sid , dep) to FNIC.
– B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccomdep , copendep) from FNIC.
– B sends (com.commit.ini, sid , dep2) to FNIC.
– B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccomdep2 , copendep2) from FNIC.
– B sets witdep ← (dep, copendep , dep1, copendep1 , dep2, copendep2).
– B parses the commitment ccomdep as (ccom ′dep , cparcom,COM.Verify), the
commitment ccomdep1 as (ccom
′
dep1
, cparcom,COM.Verify), and the com-
mitment ccomdep2 as (ccom
′
dep2
, cparcom,COM.Verify).
– B sets insdep ← (cparcom, ccom ′dep , ccom ′dep1 , ccom ′dep2).
– B stores (sid ,witdep , insdep ,writedeposit).
– B sets sidZK ← (B,V, sid ′), and sends (zk.prove.ini, sidZK,witdep , insdep)
to a new instance of FRdepZK . The Rdep is defined as follows.
Rdep ={(witdep , insdep) :
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomdep , dep, copendep) ∧
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomdep1 , dep1, copendep1) ∧
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomdep2 , dep2, copendep2) ∧
dep2 = dep + dep1 ∧ dep2 ∈ [0, depmax]}
– V receives (zk.prove.end, sidZK, insdep) from FRdepZK .
– If this is the first execution of the deposit interface, V does the following:
• V sends (com.setup.ini, sid) to FNIC.
• V receives (com.setup.end, sid , OK) from FNIC.
– V parses insdep as (cparcom, ccom ′dep , ccom ′dep1 , ccom ′dep2).
– V sets the commitment ccomdep ← (ccom ′dep , cparcom,COM.Verify), the
commitment ccomdep1 ← (ccom ′dep1 , cparcom,COM.Verify), and the com-
mitment ccomdep2 ← (ccom ′dep2 , cparcom,COM.Verify).
– V aborts if (sid , ccom ′dep2) is stored and ccom ′dep2 6= ccomdep1 .
– If (sid , ccom ′dep2) is not stored, V does the following:
• V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccomdep1) to FNIC.• V receives (com.validate.end, sid , bdep1) from FNIC.• V aborts if bdep1 6= 1.
– V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccomdep2) to FNIC.
– V receives (com.validate.end, sid , bdep2) from FNIC.
– V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccomdep) to FNIC.
– V receives (com.validate.end, sid , bdep) from FNIC.
– V aborts if bdep2 = bdep = 1 does not hold.
– V stores (sid , insdep).
– V sets sid ′AUT ← (sid) and sends (aut.send.ini, sid ′AUT, 〈writedeposit〉) to
FAUT.
– B receives (aut.send.end, sid ′AUT, 〈writedeposit〉) from FAUT.
– B aborts if (sid ,witdep , insdep ,writedeposit) is not stored.
– B parses insdep as (cparcom, ccomdep , ccomdep1 , ccomdep2).
– B parses witdep as (dep, copendep , dep1, copendep1 , dep2, copendep2).
– B deletes (sid ,witdep , insdep ,writedeposit) and stores (sid ,witdep , insdep ,
revealdeposit).
– If this is the first execution of this interface, B does the following:
• B sends (com.commit.ini, sid , 0) to FNIC.
• B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccom0, copen0) from FNIC.
• B stores (sid , ccom0, copen0).
– B stores (sid , ccomdep2 , copendep2).
– B sends to FCD the message (cd.write.ini, sid , ccom0, 0, copen0, ccomdep2 ,
dep2, copendep2).
– V receives (cd.write.end, sid , ccom0, ccomdep2) from FCD.
– V aborts if (sid , insdep) is not stored.
– V aborts if the commitment ccomdep2 in insdep is not the same as that re-
ceived from FCD, or if ccom0 stored in (sid , ccom0) is not the same as the
commitment received from FCD.
– V sends the message (aut.send.ini, sidAUT, 〈revealdeposit〉) to FAUT.
– B receives (aut.send.end, sidAUT, 〈revealdeposit〉) from FAUT.
– B aborts if (sid ,witdep , insdep , revealdeposit) is not stored.
– B deletes the record (sid ,witdep , insdep , revealdeposit).
– B updates Tblcd with [0, dep2].
– B sets sidSMT ← (B,V, sid ′).
– If this is the first execution of this interface, B and V do the following:
• B sends the following message (smt.send.ini, sidSMT, 〈dep, copendep , 0,
copen0, dep1, copendep1〉) to functionality FSMT.• V receives from functionalityFSMT the following message (smt.send.end,
sidSMT, 〈dep, copendep , 0, copen0, dep1, copendep1〉) .• V sends (com.verify.ini, sid , ccom0, 0, copen0) to FNIC.
• V receives (com.verify.end, sid , v0) from FNIC and aborts if v0 6= 1.
• V sends (com.verify.ini, sid , ccomdep1 , dep1, copendep1) to FNIC.• V receives (com.verify.end, sid , vdep1) from FNIC and aborts if vdep1 6=
1.
• V aborts if dep1 = 0 does not hold.
– Otherwise, B and V do the following:
• B sends the message (smt.send.ini, sidSMT, 〈dep, copendep〉) to FSMT.
• V receives (smt.send.end, sidSMT, 〈dep, copendep〉) from FSMT.
– V sends (com.verify.ini, sid , ccomdep , dep, copendep) to FNIC.
– V receives (com.verify.end, sid , v) from FNIC and aborts if v 6= 1.
– V aborts if dep /∈ [0, depmax].
– V outputs (pot.deposit.end, sid , dep).
5. On input (pot.transfer.ini, sid , ep, σ), V and B do the following:
– B aborts if sid /∈ (V,B, sid ′).
– B aborts if (sid , ep,N ) is not stored, or if (sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ) is not stored, or if
σ /∈ [1,N ].
– B retrieves [0, v] from Tblcd, and sets dep1 ← v.
– B aborts if dep1 < pσ .
– B sets ccomdep1 ← ccomdep2 and copendep1 ← copendep2 .
– B sets dep2← dep1 − pσ .
– B sends (com.commit.ini, sid , dep2) to FNIC.
– B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccomdep2 , copendep2) from FNIC.
– B sends (com.commit.ini, sid , σ) to FNIC.
– B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccomσ, copenσ) from FNIC.
– B sends (com.commit.ini, sid , pσ) to FNIC.
– B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccompσ , copenpσ ) from FNIC.
– B sets wittrans ← (pσ, copenpσ , dep1, copendep1 , dep2, copendep2).
– B parses the commitment ccompσ as (ccom ′pσ , cparcom,COM.Verify), the
commitment ccomdep1 as (ccom
′
dep1
, cparcom,COM.Verify), and the com-
mitment ccomdep2 as (ccom
′
dep2
, cparcom,COM.Verify).
– B sets instrans ← (cparcom, ccom ′pσ , ccom ′dep1 , ccom ′dep2).
– B stores (sid ,wit trans , instrans , readprice).
– B sets sidZK ← (B,V, sid ′), and sends the message (zk.prove.ini, sidZK,
wit trans , instrans) to a new instance of FRtransZK . The relation Rtrans is defined
as follows:
Rtrans ={(wit trans , instrans) :
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccompσ , pσ, copenpσ ) ∧
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomdep1 , dep1, copendep1) ∧
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomdep2 , dep2, copendep2) ∧
dep2 = dep1 − pσ ∧ dep2 ∈ [0, depmax]}
– V receives (zk.prove.end, sidZK, instrans) from FRtransZK .
– V parses instrans as (cparcom, ccom ′pσ , ccom ′dep1 , ccom ′dep2 , pk).
– V sets the commitment ccompσ ← (ccom ′pσ , cparcom,COM.Verify), the com-
mitment ccomdep1 ← (ccom ′dep1 , cparcom,COM.Verify), and the commit-
ment ccomdep2 ← (ccom ′dep2 , cparcom,COM.Verify).
– V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccompσ ) to FNIC.
– V receives (com.validate.end, sid , bpσ ) from FNIC.
– V aborts if bpσ 6= 1.
– V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccomdep2) to FNIC.
– V receives (com.validate.end, sid , bdep2) from FNIC.
– V aborts if bdep2 6= 1.
– V aborts if ccomdep2 stored in (sid , ccomdep2) is not the same as ccomdep1 in
instrans .
– V stores (sid , instrans).
– V sets sid ′AUT ← (sid) and sends to functionality FAUT the following mes-
sage (aut.send.ini, sid ′AUT, 〈readprice〉).
– B receives (aut.send.end, sidAUT, 〈readprice〉) from FAUT.
– B aborts if (sid ,wit trans , instrans , readprice) is not stored.
– B deletes the tuple (sid ,wit trans , instrans , readprice) and stores (sid ,wit trans ,
instrans , commitdeposit).
– B sends to functionality FNHCD the following message (nhcd.prove.ini, sid ,
ccomσ, σ, copenσ, ccompσ , pσ, copenpσ ).
– B receives (nhcd.prove.end, sid , ccomσ, ccompσ ) from FNHCD.
– V aborts if (sid , instrans) is not stored.
– V aborts if the ccompσ in instrans is not the same as that received fromFNHCD.
– V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccomσ) to FNIC.
– V receives (com.validate.end, sid , bσ) from FNIC.
– V aborts if bσ 6= 1.
– V adds ccomσ to instrans and stores (sid , instrans).
– V sends the message (aut.send.ini, sid ′AUT, 〈commitdeposit〉) to FAUT.
– B receives (aut.send.end, sid ′AUT, 〈commitdeposit〉) from FAUT.
– B deletes the tuple (sid ,wit trans , instrans , commitdeposit) and stores (sid ,
wit trans , instrans , commitcounter).
– B sends to FCD the message (cd.write.ini, sid , ccom0, 0, copen0, ccomdep2 ,
dep2, copendep2) .
– V receives (cd.write.end, sid , ccom0, ccomdep2) from FCD.
– V aborts if (sid , instrans) is not stored.
– V aborts if the ccomdep2 in instrans is not the same as that received from FCD,
or if ccom0 received from FCD is not the same as ccom0 stored by V during
the first execution of the deposit interface.
– V sends the message (aut.send.ini, sid ′AUT, 〈commitcounter〉) to FAUT.
– B receives (aut.send.end, sid ′AUT, 〈commitcounter〉) from FAUT.
– B aborts if (sid ,wit trans , instrans , commitcounter) is not stored.
– B stores (sid , ccomdep2).
– B updates Tblcd with [0, dep2].
– B retrieves [σ, v] from Tblcd and sets count1 ← v.
– B sets count2 ← count1 + 1.
– B sends (com.commit.ini, sid , count1) to FNIC.
– B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccomcount1 , copencount1) from FNIC.
– B sends (com.commit.ini, sid , count2) to FNIC.
– B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccomcount2 , copencount2) from FNIC.
– B sets witcount ← (σ, copenσ, count1, copencount1 , count2, copencount2).
– B parses the commitment ccomσ as (ccom ′σ, cparcom,COM.Verify), the com-
mitment ccomcount1 as (ccom
′
count1 , cparcom,COM.Verify), and the commit-
ment ccomcount2 as (ccom
′
count2 , cparcom,COM.Verify).
– B sets inscount ← (cparcom, ccom ′σ, ccom ′count1 , ccom ′count2).
– B deletes the tuple (sid ,wit trans , instrans , commitcounter) and stores the tuple
(sid ,witcount , inscount , readcounter).
– B sends (zk.prove.ini, sidZK,witcount , inscount) to a new instance of FRcountZK .
The relation Rcount is defined as follows:
Rcount ={(witcount , inscount) :
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomσ, σ, copenσ) ∧
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomcount1 , count1, copencount1) ∧
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomcount2 , count2, copencount2) ∧
count2 = count1 + 1}
– V receives (zk.prove.end, sidZK, inscount) from FRcountZK .
– V parses inscount as (cparcom, ccom ′σ, ccom ′count1 , ccom ′count2).
– V sets the commitment ccomσ ← (ccom ′σ, cparcom,COM.Verify), the com-
mitment ccomcount1 ← (ccom ′count1 , cparcom,COM.Verify), and the com-
mitment ccomcount2 ← (ccom ′count2 , cparcom,COM.Verify).
– V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccomcount1) to FNIC.
– V receives (com.validate.end, sid , bcount1) from FNIC.
– V aborts if bcount1 6= 1.
– V sends (com.validate.ini, sid , ccomcount2) to FNIC.
– V receives (com.validate.end, sid , bcount2) from FNIC.
– V aborts if bcount2 6= 1.
– V aborts if the commitment ccomσ in instrans is not the same as the commit-
ment ccomσ in inscount .
– V stores (sid , inscount).
– V sends the message (aut.send.ini, sid ′AUT, 〈readcounter〉) to FAUT.
– B receives (aut.send.end, sid ′AUT, 〈readcounter〉) from FAUT.
– B aborts if (sid ,witcount , inscount , readcounter) is not stored.
– B parses inscount as (cparcom, ccomσ, ccomcount1 , ccomcount2).
– B parses witcount as (σ, copenσ, count1, copencount1 , count2, copencount2).
– B deletes the tuple (sid ,witcount , inscount , readcounter) and stores the tuple
(sid ,witcount , inscount ,writecounter).
– B sends the message (cd.read.ini, sid , ccomσ, σ, copenσ, ccomcount1 , count1,
copencount1) to FCD.
– V receives (cd.read.end, sid , ccomσ, ccomcount1) from FCD.
– V aborts if inscount is not stored.
– V aborts if the commitments in inscount are not the same as those received
from FCD.
– V sends the message (aut.send.ini, sid ′AUT, 〈writecounter〉) to FAUT.
– B receives (aut.send.end, sid ′AUT, 〈writecounter〉) from FAUT.
– B aborts if (sid ,witcount , inscount ,writecounter) is not stored.
– B deletes the record (sid ,witcount , inscount ,writecounter) and stores the tuple
(sid ,witcount , inscount , transfer).
– B sends to functionality FCDthe following message (cd.write.ini, sid , ccomσ,
σ, copenσ, ccomcount2 , count2, copencount2).
– V receives (cd.write.end, sid , ccomσ, ccomcount2) from FCD.
– V aborts if inscount is not stored.
– V aborts if the commitments in inscount are not the same as those received
from FCD.
– V sends the message (aut.send.ini, sid ′AUT, 〈transfer〉) to FAUT.
– B receives (aut.send.end, sid ′AUT, 〈transfer〉) from FAUT.
– B aborts if (sid ,witcount , inscount , transfer) is not stored.
– B updates Tblcd with [σ, count2].
– B sets sidOT ← (sid , ep), and sends the message (ot.request.ini, sidOT, σ,
ccomσ, copenσ) to FOT.
– V receives (ot.request.end, sidOT, ccomσ) from FOT.
– V aborts if ccomσ received from FOT is not the same as that contained in
inscount .
– V sends the message (ot.transfer.ini, sidOT, ccomσ) to FOT.
– B receives (ot.transfer.end, sidOT,mσ) from FOT.
– B outputs (pot.transfer.end, sid ,mσ).
6. On input (pot.revealstatistic.ini, sid ,ST), B and V do the following:
– B aborts if sid /∈ (V,B, sid ′).
– B aborts if (sid , ep,N ) is not stored for any ep.
– B aborts if ST /∈ ψ.
– B computes result← ST(Tblcd).
– For each entry [i, vi] in Tblcd, where vi represents a value that was used by B
to compute result, B and V do the following:
• B sends the message (com.commit.ini, sid , i) to FNIC.
• B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccomi, copeni).
• B sends the message (com.commit.ini, sid , vi) to FNIC.
• B receives (com.commit.end, sid , ccomvi , copenvi).• B stores (sid , ccomi, ccomvi).
• B sends (cd.read.ini, sid , ccomi, i, copeni, ccomvi , vi, copenvi) to FCD.• V receives (cd.read.end, sid , ccomi, ccomvi) from FCD.
• V sends the message (com.validate.ini, sid , ccomi) to FNIC.
• V receives (com.validate.end, sid , bi) from FNIC.
• V sends the message (com.validate.ini, sid , ccomvi) to FNIC.
• V receives (com.validate.end, sid , bvi) from FNIC.
• V aborts if bi = bvi = 1 does not hold.
• V sets sidAUT ← (sid) and sends (aut.send.ini, sidAUT, 〈OK, ccomi,
ccomvi〉) to FAUT.
• B receives (aut.send.end, sidAUT, 〈OK, ccomi, ccomvi〉) from FAUT.
• B aborts if (sid , ccomi, ccomvi) is not stored.
– B sets witST ← (〈i, copeni, vi, copenvi〉∀i).
– B parses the commitment ccomi as (ccom ′i, cparcom,COM.Verify) and the
commitment ccomvi as (ccom
′
vi , cparcom,COM.Verify) for all i.
– B sets insST ← (result, cparcom, 〈ccom ′i, ccom ′vi〉∀i).
– B sets sidZK ← (B,V, sid ′) and sends (zk.prove.ini, sidZK,witST, insST) to
a new instance of FRSTZK . The relation RST is defined as follows:
RST ={(witST, insST) :
[ ∀i 1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomi, i, copeni) ∧
1 = COM.Verify(cparcom, ccomvi , vi, copenvi) ] ∧
result = ST(〈i, vi〉∀i) }
– V receives (zk.prove.end, sidZK, insST) from FRSTZK .
– V aborts if the commitments received from FCD are not the same as those in
insST.
– V outputs (pot.revealstatistic.end, sid , result, ST).
Theorem 1. Construction ΠPOTS realizes functionality FPOTS in the (FAUT,FSMT,
FNIC||SNIC,FRZK,FOT,FCD,FNHCD)-hybrid model.
We prove this theorem in Section B.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed an ideal functionality FPOTS for priced oblivious transfer with pur-
chase statistics and dynamic pricing, and we have described a construction ΠPOTS that
securely realizes FPOTS. Thanks to its modular design, ΠPOTS can be instantiated
with any secure oblivious transfer scheme, unlike previous POT schemes. In terms of
functionality, ΠPOTS gives the seller the ability to receive aggregate statistics about the
purchases of the buyer, and to change the prices dynamically throughout the protocol
execution.
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A Building Blocks of Our Construction
A.1 Ideal Functionality FAUT
Our protocol uses the functionality FAUT for an authenticated channel in [11]. FAUT
interacts with a sender T and a receiver R, and consists of one interface aut.send.
T uses the aut.send interface to send a message m to FAUT. FAUT leaks m to the
simulator S and, after receiving a response from S, FAUT sends m to R. S cannot
modify m . The session identifier sid contains the identities of T andR.
Description of FAUT. FAUT is parameterized by a message spaceM.
1. On input (aut.send.ini, sid ,m) from a party T :
– Abort if sid 6= (T ,R, sid ′) or if m /∈M.
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid ,R,m).
– Send (aut.send.sim, sid , qid ,m) to S.
S. On input (aut.send.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid ,R,m) is not stored.
– Delete the record (qid ,R,m).
– Send (aut.send.end, sid ,m) toR.
A.2 Ideal Functionality FSMT
Our protocol uses the functionality FSMT for secure message transmission described
in [11]. FSMT interacts with a sender T and a receiverR, and consists of one interface
smt.send. T uses the smt.send interface to send a message m to FSMT. FSMT leaks
l(m), where l : M → N is a function that leaks the message length, to the simulator
S. After receiving a response from S, FSMT sends m to R. S cannot modify m . The
session identifier sid contains the identities of T andR.
Description of FSMT. FSMT is parameterized by a message spaceM and by a leakage
function l :M→ N, which leaks the message length.
1. On input (smt.send.ini, sid ,m) from a party T :
– Abort if sid 6= (T ,R, sid ′) or if m /∈M.
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid ,R,m).
– Send (smt.send.sim, sid , qid , l(m)) to S.
S. On input (smt.send.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid ,R,m) is not stored.
– Delete the record (qid ,R,m).
– Send (smt.send.end, sid ,m) toR.
A.3 Ideal Functionality FNIC for Non-Interactive Commitments
Our protocol uses the functionality FNIC for non-interactive commitments in [8]. FNIC
interacts with parties Pi and consists of the following interfaces:
1. Any party Pi uses the com.setup interface to set up the functionality.
2. Any party Pi uses the com.commit interface to send a message cm and obtain
a commitment ccom and an opening copen . A commitment ccom = (ccom ′,
cparcom,COM.Verify), where ccom ′ is the commitment, cparcom are the public
parameters, and COM.Verify is the verification algorithm.
3. Any party Pi uses the com.validate interface to send a commitment ccom in order
to check that ccom contains the correct public parameters and verification algo-
rithm.
4. Any party Pi uses the com.verify interface to send (ccom, cm, copen) in order to
verify that ccom is a commitment to the message cm with the opening copen .
FNIC can be realized by a perfectly hiding commitment scheme, such as Pedersen com-
mitments [8]. In [8], a method is described to use FNIC in order to ensure that a party
sends the same input cm to several ideal functionalities. For this purpose, the party first
uses com.commit to get a commitment ccom to cm with opening copen . Then the party
sends (ccom, cm, copen) as input to each of the functionalities, and each functionality
runs COM.Verify to verify the commitment. Finally, other parties in the protocol re-
ceive the commitment ccom from each of the functionalities and use the com.validate
interface to validate ccom . Then, if ccom received from all the functionalities is the
same, the binding property provided by FNIC ensures that all the functionalities re-
ceived the same input cm . When using FNIC, it is needed to work in the FNIC||SNIC-
hybrid model, where SNIC is any simulator for a construction that realizes FNIC.
Description of FNIC. COM.TrapCom, COM.TrapOpen and COM.Verify are ppt algo-
rithms.
1. On input (com.setup.ini, sid) from a party Pi:
– If (sid , cparcom,COM.TrapCom,COM.TrapOpen,COM.Verify, ctdcom) is
already stored, include Pi in the set P, and send (com.setup.end, sid ,OK )
as a public delayed output to Pi.
– Otherwise proceed to generate a random qid , store (qid ,Pi) and send the mes-
sage (com.setup.req, sid , qid) to S.
S. On input (com.setup.alg, sid , qid ,m) from S:
– Abort if no pair (qid ,Pi) for some Pi is stored.
– Delete record (qid ,Pi).
– If (sid , cparcom,COM.TrapCom,COM.TrapOpen,COM.Verify, ctdcom) is
already stored, include Pi in the set P and send (com.setup.end, sid ,OK ) to
Pi.
– Otherwise proceed as follows.
• m is (cparcom,COM.TrapCom,COM.TrapOpen,COM.Verify, ctdcom).
• Initialize both an empty table Tblcom and an empty set P, and store (sid ,
cparcom,COM.TrapCom,COM.TrapOpen,COM.Verify, ctdcom).
• Include Pi in the set P and send (com.setup.end, sid ,OK ) to Pi.
2. On input (com.validate.ini, sid , ccom) from any party Pi:
– Abort if Pi /∈ P.
– Parse ccom as (ccom ′, cparcom ′,COM.Verify′).
– Set v ← 1 if cparcom ′ = cparcom and COM.Verify′ = COM.Verify. Other-
wise, set v ← 0.
– Send (com.validate.end, sid , v) to Pi.
3. On input (com.commit.ini, sid , cm) from any party Pi:
– Abort if Pi /∈ P or if cm /∈M, whereM is defined in cparcom .
– Compute (ccom, cinfo)← COM.TrapCom(sid , cparcom, ctdcom).
– Abort if there is an entry [ccom, cm ′, copen ′, 1] in Tblcom such that cm 6= cm ′.
– Run copen ← COM.TrapOpen(sid , cm, cinfo).
– Abort if 1 6= COM.Verify(sid , cparcom, ccom, cm, copen).
– Append [ccom, cm, copen, 1] to Tblcom.
– Set ccom ← (ccom, cparcom,COM.Verify).
– Send (com.commit.end, sid , ccom, copen) to Pi.
4. On input (com.verify.ini, sid , ccom, cm, copen) from any party Pi:
– Abort if Pi /∈ P or if cm /∈ M or if copen /∈ R, whereM and R are defined
in cparcom .
– Parse ccom as the tuple (ccom ′, cparcom ′,COM.Verify′). Abort if the param-
eters cparcom ′ 6= cparcom or COM.Verify′ 6= COM.Verify.
– If there is an entry [ccom ′, cm, copen, u] in Tblcom, set v ← u.
– Else, proceed as follows:
• If there is an entry [ccom ′, cm ′, copen ′, 1] in Tblcom such that cm 6= cm ′,
set v ← 0.
• Else, proceed as follows:
∗ Set v ← COM.Verify(sid , cparcom, ccom ′, cm, copen).
∗ Append [ccom ′, cm, copen, v] to Tblcom.
– Send (com.verify.end, sid , v) to Pi.
A.4 Ideal Functionality FRZK for Zero-Knowledge
Let R be a polynomial time computable binary relation. For tuples (wit , ins) ∈ R
we call wit the witness and ins the instance. Our protocol uses the ideal functionality
FRZK for zero-knowledge in [11]. FRZK is parameterized by a description of a relation
R, runs with a prover P and a verifier V , and consists of one interface zk.prove. P uses
zk.prove to send a witness wit and an instance ins to FRZK. FRZK checks whether (wit ,
ins) ∈ R, and, in that case, sends the instance ins to V . The simulator S learns ins
but not wit . In our POT protocol, we use relations that include commitments as part of
the instance, while the committed value and the opening are part of the witness. The
relation uses the verification algorithm of the commitment scheme to check correctness
of the commitment. This allows us to use the method described in [8] to ensure that an
input FRZK is equal to the input of other functionalities in our protocol.
Description of FRZK. FRZK is parameterized by a description of a relation R. FRZK inter-
acts with a prover P and a verifier V .
1. On input (zk.prove.ini, sid ,wit , ins) from P:
– Abort if sid 6= (P,V, sid ′) or if (wit , ins) /∈ R.
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , ins).
– Send (zk.prove.sim, sid , qid , ins) to S.
S. On input (zk.prove.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , ins) is not stored.
– Parse sid as (P,V, sid ′).
– Delete the record (qid , ins).
– Send (zk.prove.end, sid , ins) to V .
A.5 Ideal Functionality FOT for Oblivious Transfer
Our protocol uses the ideal functionality FOT for oblivious transfer. FOT interacts with
a sender E and a receiver R, and consists of three interfaces ot.init, ot.request and
ot.transfer.
1. E uses the ot.init interface to send the messages 〈mn〉Nn=1 to FOT. FOT stores
〈mn〉Nn=1 and sends the number N of messages to R. The simulator S also learns
N .
2. R uses the ot.request interface to send an index σ ∈ [1,N ], a commitment ccomσ
and an opening copenσ to FOT. FOT parses the commitment ccomσ as (cparcom,
comσ,COM.Verify) and verifies the commitment by running COM.Verify. FOT
stores [σ, ccomσ] and sends ccomσ to E .
3. E uses the ot.transfer interface to send a commitment ccomσ to FOT. If a tuple
[σ, ccomσ] is stored, FOT sends the message mσ toR.
FOT is similar to existing functionalities for OT [10], except that it receives a commit-
ment ccomσ to the index σ and an opening copenσ for that commitment. In addition,
the transfer phase is split up into two interfaces ot.request and ot.transfer, so that E re-
ceives ccomσ in the request phase. These changes are needed to use in our POT protocol
the method in [8] to ensure that, when purchasing an item, the buyer sends the same in-
dex σ to FOT and to other functionalities. It is generally easy to modify existing UC
OT protocols so that they realize our functionality FOT.
Description of FOT. Functionality FOT runs with a sender E and a receiver R, and is
parameterised with a maximum number of messages Nmax and a message spaceM.
1. On input (ot.init.ini, sid , 〈mn〉Nn=1) from E :
(a) Abort if sid /∈ (E ,R, sid ′), or if (sid , 〈mn〉Nn=1, 0) is already stored, or if N >
Nmax.
(b) Abort if for n = 1 to N , mn /∈M.
(c) Store (sid , 〈mn〉Nn=1, 0).
(d) Send (ot.init.sim, sid ,N ) to S.
S. On input (ot.init.rep, sid) from S:
(a) Abort if (sid , 〈mn〉Nn=1, 0) is not stored, or if (sid , 〈mn〉Nn=1, 1) is already
stored.
(b) Store (sid , 〈mn〉Nn=1, 1) and initialize an empty table Tblot.
(c) Send (ot.init.end, sid ,N ) toR.
2. On input (ot.request.ini, sid , σ, ccomσ, copenσ) fromR:
(a) Abort if (sid , 〈mn〉Nn=1, 1) is not stored.
(b) Abort if σ /∈ [1,N ].
(c) Parse ccomσ as (cparcom, comσ, COM.Verify).
(d) Abort if COM.Verify is not a ppt algorithm, or if 1 6= COM.Verify(cparcom,
comσ, copenσ, σ).
(e) Create a fresh qid and store (qid , σ, ccomσ).
(f) Send (ot.request.sim, sid , qid , ccomσ) to S.
S. On input (ot.request.rep, sid , qid) from S:
(a) Abort if (qid , σ, ccomσ) is not stored.
(b) Append [σ, ccomσ] to Tblot.
(c) Delete the record (qid , σ, ccomσ).
(d) Send (ot.request.end, sid , ccomσ) to E .
3. On input (ot.transfer.ini, sid , ccomσ) from E :
(a) Abort if there is no entry [σ, ccomσ] in Tblot.
(b) Create a fresh qid and store (qid , ccomσ).
(c) Send (ot.transfer.sim, sid , qid) to S.
S. On input (ot.transfer.rep, sid , qid , b), if E is corrupt, or (ot.transfer.rep, sid , qid),
if E is honest, from S:
(a) Abort if (qid , ccomσ) is not stored.
(b) If E is corrupt and b = 0, set v ←⊥.
(c) Else, set v ← mσ .
(d) Delete the record (qid , ccomσ).
(e) Send (ot.transfer.end, sid , v) toR.
A.6 Ideal Functionality FCD for a Committed Database
Our protocol uses the ideal functionality FCD for a committed database in [7]. FCD
interacts with a prover P and a verifier V , and consists of three interfaces cd.setup,
cd.read and cd.write.
1. Either P or V can invoke the cd.setup interface.FCD receives as input a table Tblcd
with N entries of the form [i, v], for i = 0 to N . FCD stores Tblcd and sends Tblcd
to the party that did not invoke the interface.
2. P uses cd.read to send a position i and a value vr to FCD, along with commit-
ments (ccomi , copeni) and openings (ccomr , copenr ) to the position and value
respectively. FCD verifies the commitments and checks that there is an entry [i, vr ]
in the table Tblcd. In that case, FCD sends ccomi and ccomr to V . The simulator S
also learns ccomi and ccomr .
3. P uses cd.write to send a position i and a value vw to FCD, along with commit-
ments (ccomi , copeni) and openings (ccomw , copenw ) to the position and value
respectively. FCD verifies the commitments and then updates Tblcd to store vw at
position i. FCD sends ccomi and ccomw to V . The simulator S also learns ccomi
and ccomw .
Basically, FCD allows a prover P to prove to a verifier V that two commitments ccomi
and ccomr commit to a position and value that are read from a table, and that two
commitments ccomi and ccomw commit to a position and value that are written into the
table. In comparison to the functionality in [7], we add an interface cd.setup that allows
P or V to initialize the table. This extension was suggested in [7]. In [7], an efficient
construction for FCD based on hiding vector commitments [16,12] is proposed. In our
POT protocol, FCD is used to store and update the deposit of the buyer and the counters
of the number of purchases for each of the item categories.
Description of FCD. Functionality FCD is parameterised by a universe of state values
Uv and by a maximum state size Nmax. FCD interacts with a prover P and a verifier V .
1. On input (cd.setup.ini, sid ,Tblcd) from P or V:
– Abort if sid /∈ (P,V, sid ′) or if (sid ′,Tbl′cd, 0) is already stored.
– Abort if Tblcd does not consist of entries of the form [i, v], or if N > Nmax,
where N is the number of entries in Tblcd.
– Abort if for i = 0 to N , v /∈ Uv for any entry [i, v] in Tblcd.
– Store (sid ,Tblcd, 0).
– Send (cd.setup.sim, sid) to S.
S. On input (cd.setup.rep, sid) from S:
– Abort if (sid ,Tblcd, 0) is not stored, or if (sid ,Tblcd, 1) is already stored.
– Store (sid,Tblcd, 1).
– Initialize a counter cp← 0 for the prover and a counter cv ← 0 for the verifier.
– Send (cd.setup.end, sid ,Tblcd) to V , if the cd.setup.ini message was sent by
P , or to P if the cd.setup.ini message was sent by V .
2. On input (cd.read.ini, sid , ccomi , i, copeni , ccomr , vr , copenr ) from the prover P:
– Abort if sid /∈ (P,V, sid ′), or if Tblcd, cp, and cv are not stored.
– Abort if i /∈ [1,Nmax], or if vr /∈ Uv , or if [i, vr ] is not stored in Tblcd.
– Parse the commitment ccomi as (ccom ′i, cparcomi ,COM.Verifyi) and ccomr
as (ccom ′r, cparcomr ,COM.Verifyr).
– Abort if cparcomi 6= cparcomr , or if COM.Verifyi 6= COM.Verifyr, or if
COM.Verifyi is not a ppt algorithm, or if 1 6= COM.Verifyi(cparcomi , ccomi ,
i, copeni), or if 1 6= COM.Verifyr(cparcomr , ccomr , vr , copenr ).
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , ccomi , ccomr , cp).
– Send (cd.read.sim, sid , qid , ccomi , ccomr ) to S.
S. On input (cd.read.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , ccomi , ccomr , cp′) is not stored, or if cp′ 6= cv.
– Delete the record (qid , ccomi , ccomr , cp′).
– Send (cd.read.end, sid , ccomi , ccomr ) to V .
3. On input (cd.write.ini, sid , ccomi , i, copeni , ccomw , vw , copenw ) from the prover
P:
– Abort if sid /∈ (P,V, sid ′), or if Tblcd, cp, and cv are not stored.
– Abort if i /∈ [1,Nmax], or if vw /∈ Uv .
– Parse the commitment ccomi as (ccom ′i, cparcomi ,COM.Verifyi) and ccomw
as (ccom ′w, cparcomw ,COM.Verifyw).
– Abort if cparcomi = cparcomw , or if COM.Verifyi = COM.Verifyw, or if
COM.Verifyi is not a ppt algorithm, or if 1 6= COM.Verifyi(cparcomi , ccomi ,
i, copeni), or if 1 6= COM.Verifyw(cparcomw , ccomw , vw , copenw ).
– Increment the counter cp and store [i, vw ] in Tblcd.
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , ccomi , ccomw , cp).
– Send (cd.write.sim, sid , qid , ccomi , ccomw ) to S.
S. On input (cd.write.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , ccomi , ccomw , cp′) is not stored, or if cp′ 6= cv + 1.
– Increment the counter cv.
– Delete the record (qid , ccomi , ccomw , cp′).
– Send (cd.write.end, sid , ccomi , ccomw ) to V .
A.7 Ideal Functionality FNHCD for a Non-Hiding Committed Database
Our protocol uses the ideal functionality FNHCD for a non-hiding committed database
in [17].FNHCD interacts with a party P0 and a party P1, and consists of three interfaces
nhcd.setup, nhcd.prove and nhcd.write.
1. P1 uses nhcd.setup to send a table Tblnhcd with N entries of the form [i, v] (for
i = 0 to N ) to FNHCD. FNHCD stores Tblnhcd and sends Tblnhcd to P0. The
simulator S also learns Tblnhcd.
2. Pb (b ∈ [0, 1]) uses nhcd.prove to send a position i and a value vr to FNHCD, along
with commitments and openings along with commitments and openings (ccomi ,
copeni) and (ccomr , copenr ) to the position and value respectively. FNHCD veri-
fies the commitments and checks that there is an entry [i, vr ] in the table Tblnhcd.
In that case, FNHCD sends ccomi and ccomr to P1−b. The simulator S also learns
ccomi and ccomr .
3. P1 uses nhcd.write to send a position i and a value vw to FNHCD. FNHCD updates
Tblnhcd to contain value vw at position i and sends i and vw to P0. The simulator
S also learns i and vw .
FNHCD is similar to the functionality FCD described above. The main difference is that
the contents of the table Tblnhcd are known by both parties. For this reason, both parties
can invoke the nhcd.prove interface to prove that two commitments ccomi and ccomr
commit to a position and value stored in Tblnhcd. In addition, the interface nhcd.write
reveals the updates to Tblnhcd made by P1 to P0. In [17], an efficient construction for
FNHCD based on non-hiding vector commitments is proposed. In our POT protocol,
FNHCD will be used by the seller, acting as P1, to store and update the prices of items.
The buyer, acting as P0, uses the nhcd.prove interface to prove to the seller that the
correct price for the item purchased is used.
Description of FNHCD. Functionality FNHCD is parameterised by a universe of values
Uv and by a maximum table size N . FNHCD interacts with a party P0 and a party P1.
In the following, b ∈ [0, 1].
1. On input (nhcd.setup.ini, sid ,Tblnhcd) from P1:
– Abort if sid /∈ (P0,P1, sid ′) or if (sid ,Tbl′nhcd, c1) is already stored.
– Abort if Tblnhcd does not consist of N entries of the form [i, v].
– Abort if for i = 1 to N , v /∈ Uv for any entry [i, v] in Tblnhcd.
– Initialize a counter c1 ← 0 for P1 and store (sid ,Tblnhcd, c1).
– Send (nhcd.setup.sim, sid ,Tblnhcd) to S.
S. On input (nhcd.setup.rep, sid) from S:
– Abort if (sid ,Tblnhcd, c1) is not stored, or if (sid ,Tblnhcd, c0) is stored.
– Initialize a counter c0 ← 0 for P0 and store (sid ,Tblnhcd, c0).
– Send (nhcd.setup.end, sid ,Tblnhcd) to P0.
2. On input (nhcd.write.ini, sid , i, vw ) from P1:
– Abort if (sid ,Tblnhcd, c1) is not stored.
– Abort if i /∈ [1,N ], or if vw /∈ Uv .
– Increment c1 and update c1 and the table entry [i, vw ] in (sid ,Tblnhcd, c1).
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , i, vw , c1).
– Send (nhcd.write.sim, sid , qid , i, vw ) to S.
S. On input (nhcd.write.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , i, vw , c′1) or (sid ,Tblnhcd, c0) are not stored, or if c′1 6= c0 + 1.
– Increment c0 and update c0 and the table entry [i, vw ] in (sid ,Tblnhcd, c0).
– Delete the record (qid , i, vw , c′1).
– Send (nhcd.write.end, sid , i, vw ) to P0.
3. On input (nhcd.prove.ini, sid , ccomi , i, copeni , ccomr , vr , copenr ) from Pb:
– Abort if (sid ,Tblnhcd, cb) is not stored.
– Abort if i /∈ [1,N ], or if vr /∈ Uv , or if [i, vr ] is not stored in Tblnhcd.
– Parse ccomi as (ccom ′i, cparcomi ,COM.Verifyi).
– Parse ccomr as (ccom ′r, cparcomr ,COM.Verifyr).
– Abort if cparcomi 6= cparcomr , or if COM.Verifyi 6= COM.Verifyr, or if
COM.Verifyi is not a ppt algorithm.
– Abort if 1 6= COM.Verifyi(cparcomi , ccomi , i, copeni).
– Abort if 1 6= COM.Verifyr(cparcomr , ccomr , vr , copenr ).
– Create a fresh qid and store (qid , ccomi , ccomr ,Pb, cb).
– Send (nhcd.prove.sim, sid , qid , ccomi , ccomr ) to S.
S. On input (nhcd.prove.rep, sid , qid) from S:
– Abort if (qid , ccomi , ccomr ,Pb, c′b) or (sid ,Tblnhcd, c1−b) are not stored, or
if c′b 6= c1−b.
– Delete the record (qid , ccomi , ccomr ,Pb, c′b).
– Send (nhcd.prove.end, sid , ccomi , ccomr ) to P1−b.
B Security Analysis of ConstructionΠPOTS
To prove that our construction ΠPOTS securely realizes the ideal functionality FPOTS,
we have to show that for any environment Z and any adversary A there exists a simu-
lator S such that Z cannot distinguish between whether it is interacting with A and the
protocol in the real world or with S and FPOTS. The simulator thereby plays the role
of all honest parties in the real world and interacts with FPOTS for all corrupt parties in
the ideal world.
Our simulator S runs copies of the functionalities FAUT, FSMT, FNIC, FRZK, FOT,
FCD, and FNHCD. When any of the copies of these functionalities abort, S implicitly
forwards the abortion message to the adversary if the functionality sends the abortion
message to a corrupt party.
In Section B.1, we analyze the security of construction ΠPOTS when the buyer B is
corrupt. In Section B.2, we analyze the security of construction ΠPOTS when the seller
V is corrupt.
B.1 Security Analysis ofΠPOTS when B is corrupt
We first describe the simulator S for the case in which the buyer B is corrupt. S simu-
lates the protocol by running the seller’s side of protocol ΠPOTS and copies of the ideal
functionalities involved.
– Upon receiving a message fromA, S uses the first field of that message to associate
the message with one of the ideal functionalities FAUT, FSMT, FNIC, FRZK, FOT,
FCD, or FNHCD, and runs a copy of the corresponding functionality on input that
message.
– When a copy of any of the functionalities FAUT, FSMT, FNIC, FRZK, FOT, FCD,
or FNHCD sends a message to B or to S, S forwards the output of the functionality
to A.
– When a copy of any of the functionalities FAUT, FSMT, FNIC, FRZK, FOT, FCD,
orFNHCD sends a message to V , S runs protocolΠPOTS for the seller on input that
message, except when FNIC sends a delayed output (com.setup.end, sid , OK) to
V .
– When FPOTS sends the message (pot.init.sim, sid , ep,N ) to S, S sends the mes-
sage (pot.init.rep, sid , ep) to FPOTS.
– WhenFPOTS sends the message (pot.setupprices.sim, sid , 〈p〉Nmaxn=1 ) to S, S sends
the message (pot.setupprices.rep, sid) to FPOTS.
– When FPOTS sends the message (pot.updateprice.sim, sid , qid ,n, p) to the simu-
lator S, the simulator S sends the message (pot.updateprice.rep, sid , qid) to func-
tionality FPOTS.
– When FPOTS outputs the message (pot.init.end, sid , ep,N ), S runs the protocol
ΠPOTS for the seller on input (pot.init.ini, sid , ep, 〈mn〉Nn=1), where 〈mn〉Nn=1 are
selected at random.
– When FPOTS outputs the message (pot.setupprices.end, sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ), S runs
protocol ΠPOTS for the seller on input (pot.setupprices.ini, sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ).
– When FPOTS outputs the message (pot.updateprice.end, sid ,n, p), S runs proto-
col ΠPOTS for the seller on input (pot.updateprice.ini, sid ,n, p).
– When protocol ΠPOTS for the seller outputs the message (pot.deposit.end, sid ,
dep), S sends the message (pot.deposit.ini, sid , dep) to FPOTS. When FPOTS
sends the message (pot.deposit.sim, sid , qid) to S, S sends (pot.deposit.rep, sid ,
qid) to FPOTS.
– When protocol ΠPOTS outputs the message (pot.transfer.end, sid ,mσ), the sim-
ulator S retrieves the message (ot.request.ini, sid , σ, ccomσ, copenσ) sent by the
adversary A to the ideal functionality FOT. The simulator S sets m ′σ ← mσ for
the copy of FOT associated with sid ′OT, such that sid ′OT ∈ (sid , ep). The simu-
lator S sends the message (pot.transfer.ini, sid , ep, σ) to the functionality FPOTS.
When FPOTS sends the message (pot.transfer.sim, sid , qid , ep) to S, S sends
(pot.transfer.rep, sid , qid) to FPOTS.
– When protocol ΠPOTS for the seller outputs (pot.revealstatistic.end, sid , v,ST),
S sends the message (pot.revealstatistic.ini, sid ,ST) to FPOTS. When FPOTS
sends the message (pot.revealstatistic.sim, sid , qid) to S, S sends the message
(pot.revealstatistic.rep, sid , qid) to FPOTS.
– S outputs failure if A produces two openings for a commitment.
Theorem 2. When the buyer B is corrupt, the construction ΠPOTS described in Sec-
tion B.1 securely realizes FPOTS in the (FAUT,FSMT,FNIC||SNIC,FRZK,FOT,FCD,
FNHCD)-hybrid model.
Proof of Theorem 2. We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the environ-
ment Z cannot distinguish between the ensemble REALΠPOTS,A,Z and the ensemble
IDEALFPOTS,S,Z with non-negligible probability. We denote by Pr [Game i] the prob-
ability that the environment distinguishes Game i from the real-world protocol.
Game 0: This game corresponds to the execution of the real-world protocol. Therefore,
Pr [Game 0] = 0.
Game 1: This game proceeds as Game 0, except that Game 1 replaces the messages
〈m〉Nmaxn=1 that are sent as input to the ot.init interface by random messages. This
change does not alter the view of the environment because, in the ot.init interface,
FOT does not send the messages to the simulator or to the buyer. Moreover,Game 1
copies the correct messagemσ to the copy ofFOT before the ot.transfer interface is
executed, so the corrupt buyer receives the correct message. Hence, [Pr [Game 1]−
Pr [Game 0]] = 0.
Game 2: This game proceeds as Game 1, except for the fact that Game 2 outputs
failure when the adversary produces two openings for the same commitment. How-
ever, the probability that the adversary may produce two such openings is negligi-
ble, thanks to the binding property enforced by FNIC. Therefore, [Pr [Game 2] −
Pr [Game 1]] = 0.
S is indistinguishable from the real world protocol because it runs as the real-world
protocol, except when it outputs failure. The probability that S outputs failure is neg-
ligible thanks to the security properties ensured by the functionalities FAUT, FSMT,
FNIC, FRZK, FOT, FCD, and FNHCD. FNIC serves to ensure that all commitments used
in the protocol are binding, while FRZK guarantees that the witness and instance values
provided by the buyer for the deposit, transfer, and revealstatistic phases of the proto-
col satisfy the relations Rdep ,Rtrans and Rcount , and RST respectively. Rdep is used to
check whether the buyer is updating deposit values correctly during the deposit phase,
while also ensuring that the commitments ccomdep , ccomdep1 , and ccomdep2 commit
to the deposit value dep, the initial deposit dep1, and the final deposit value dep2. The
protocol relies on Rtrans to ensure that the buyer updates deposit and counter values
consistently after a purchase, while also ensuring that the commitments to the message
price pσ , initial and final deposit values dep1 and dep2, counter index σ, and initial and
final counter values count1 and count2 are valid. RST is used to make sure that the
result of the evaluation of function ST on Tblcd is accurate, and that the commitments
to all the indices and values of the counters in Tblcd used to determine the result of
ST(Tblcd) are valid. FCD ensures that the buyer’s deposit value dep and all counter
values 〈countn〉Nmaxn=1 read from positions in TblS are equal to the values previously
written to those positions. FNHCD is used to ensure that the buyer can prove that she is
using the right prices for the right messages (pσ is used for mσ). Finally, FOT ensures
sender security (the buyer does not learn any information about messages that have not
been purchased).
The distribution of Game 2 is identical to that of our simulation. This concludes the
proof of theorem 2.
B.2 Security Analysis ofΠPOTS when V is corrupt
In this section, we describe the simulator S for the case in which the seller V is corrupt.
S simulates the protocol by running copies of the ideal functionalities and protocol
ΠPOTS for the buyer.
– Upon receiving a message fromA, S uses the first field of that message to associate
the message with one of the ideal functionalities FAUT, FSMT, FNIC, FRZK, FOT,
FCD, or FNHCD, and runs a copy of the corresponding functionality on input that
message.
– When a copy of any of the functionalities FAUT, FSMT, FNIC, FRZK, FOT, FCD,
or FNHCD sends a message to V or to S, S forwards the output of the functionality
to A, except when FNIC outputs a delayed message (com.setup.end, sid , OK).
– When a copy of any of the functionalities FAUT, FSMT, FNIC, FRZK, FOT, FCD,
or FNHCD sends a message to B, S runs protocol ΠPOTS for the buyer on input
that message.
– When protocol ΠPOTS for the buyer sends a message to any of the functionalities
FAUT,FSMT,FNIC,FRZK,FOT,FCD, orFNHCD, S runs the copy of the respective
functionality on input that message.
– WhenFPOTS sends the message (pot.deposit.sim, sid , qid) to S, S sends the mes-
sage (pot.deposit.rep, sid , qid) to FPOTS.
– When FPOTS sends the message (pot.revealstatistic.sim, sid , qid) to S, S sends
the message (pot.revealstatistic.rep, sid , qid) to FPOTS.
– When FNIC outputs the message (com.setup.req, sid , qid), S runs a copy of SNIC
on input that message. When SNIC replies with (com.setup.alg, sid , qid ,m), S
runs FNIC on input that message.
– When protocol ΠPOTS for the buyer outputs the message (pot.init.end, sid , ep,
N ), S sets sid ′OT ← (sid , ep), and retrieves (ot.init.ini, sidOT, 〈mn〉Nn=1) sent
by A to FOT such that sid ′OT = sidOT, and sends the message (pot.init.ini,
sid , ep, 〈mn〉Nn=1) to FPOTS. When FPOTS sends the message (pot.init.sim, sid ,
ep,N ) to S, S sends the message (pot.init.rep, sid , ep) to FPOTS.
– When protocol ΠPOTS for the buyer outputs the message (pot.setupprices.end,
sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ), S sends the message (pot.setupprices.ini, sid , 〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ) to the
functionality FPOTS. When FPOTS sends the message (pot.setupprices.sim, sid ,
〈pn〉Nmaxn=1 ) to S, S sends the message (pot.setupprices.rep, sid) to FPOTS.
– When protocol ΠPOTS for the buyer outputs the message (pot.updateprice.end,
sid ,n, p), S sends the message (pot.updateprice.ini, sid ,n, p) to FPOTS.
– When FPOTS sends (pot.updateprice.sim, sid , qid ,n, p) to S, S sends the mes-
sage (pot.updateprice.rep, sid , qid) to FPOTS.
– When FPOTS outputs the message (pot.deposit.end, sid , dep), S sends the mes-
sage (pot.deposit.ini, sid , dep) to protocol ΠPOTS for the buyer.
– S selects σ such that σ is associated with the message with the lowest price pσ and
sends the message (pot.transfer.ini, sid , ep, σ) to ΠPOTS for the buyer.
– When FPOTS outputs the message (pot.revealstatistic.end, sid , v,ST), S sends
the message (pot.revealstatistic.ini, sid ,ST) to protocol ΠPOTS for the buyer.
Theorem 3. When the seller V is corrupt, the construction ΠPOTS described in Sec-
tion B.1 securely realizes FPOTS in the (FAUT,FSMT,FNIC||SNIC,FRZK,FOT,FCD,
FNHCD)-hybrid model.
Proof of Theorem 3. We show by means of a series of hybrid games that the environ-
ment Z cannot distinguish between the ensemble REALΠPOTS,A,Z and the ensemble
IDEALFPOTS,S,Z with non-negligible probability. We denote by Pr [Game i] the prob-
ability that the environment distinguishes Game i from the real-world protocol.
Game 0: This game corresponds to the execution of the real-world protocol. Therefore,
Pr [Game 0] = 0.
Game 1: This game proceeds as Game 0, except that in Game 1, the simulator sim-
ulates the buyer’s side of the protocol by selecting σ associated with the message
with the lowest price. This does not alter the view of the environment. Therefore,
[Pr[Game 1]− Pr[Game 0] = 0].
Our simulator S is indistinguishable from the real world protocol because it runs as the
real-world protocol, except when it outputs failure. The probability that S outputs fail-
ure is negligible thanks to the security properties ensured by the functionalities FAUT,
FSMT, FNIC, FRZK, FOT, FCD, and FNHCD. Concretely, FNIC ensures that commit-
ments are binding, and A does not learn any information on σ, thanks to FOT. The
obliviousness property provided by FCD also ensures that A does not learn any infor-
mation on the counter values countn and deposit value dep stored in Tblcd.
The distribution of Game 1 is identical to that of our simulation. This concludes the
proof of theorem 3.
